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ARGUMENT 
L THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE SECTION 30-3-5(10) 
DOES NOT GIVE THE TRIAL COURT THE DISCRETION TO 
RETROACTIVELY TERMINATE ALIMONY BASED ON 
COHABITATION, 
Utah Code section 30-3-5(10) provides, "[a]ny order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a foimei spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony 
that the foimer spouse is cohabitatmg with another person " UTAH CODE ANN § 30-3-
5(10) (West 2004) This section clearly provides that alimony is to be terminated 
prospectively upon the establishment of cohabitation and does not allow for retroactive 
termination of alimony The legislature knows how to give a court authority to modify an 
alimony award reti oactively, (see e g UTAH CODE ANN § 78B-12-112(4) (2008) 
(previously numbered as 78-45-9 3(4)) but did not do so The legislature also knows how 
to terminate alimony automatically upon a stated event, such as death or remarriage, (see 
§ 30-3-5(9)), but did not provide that alimony be terminated automatically upon the event 
of cohabitation 
An analysis of Utah Code section 30-3-5(10) will show that the legislature never 
intended alimony to be terminated retroactively on the basis of cohabitation For the 
purpose of ascertaining statutory intent, we note that before alimony can be terminated, 
the party paying alimony must establish "that the former spouse is cohabitatmg with 
another person," § 30-3-5(10) (emphasis added), and not that "the former spouse was 
cohabitatmg with another person " One of the reasons for the use of the present tense m 
this section is to make sure that there is a sufficiently solid relationship, such that the 
1 
needs of the spouse and any children will be provided for In Paffel v Pafjel, the court 
explained that the purpose of spousal support is to enable the spouse receiving alimony 
payments to maintain a standaid of living enjoyed during the mairiage and to prevent the 
spouse fiom becoming a public chaige Pajjel v Paffel, 732 P 2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986) 
Drafting section 30-3-5(10) in the piesent tense shows that the legislature 
envisioned a scenario where the payee spouse is piesently cohabitatmg with another 
peison who will provide financial support This suppoit from the new cohabitant will 
leplace the lost alimony payments and thus prevent the spouse from becoming a public 
charge To require the payor spouse to prove that the payee spouse is presently 
cohabitatmg with another person shows that the legislature never intended that alimony 
be terminated retroactively 
A similar motive is seen m Utah Code section 30-3-5(9), which provides, "any 
order of the court that a party pay alimony to a lormer spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse However, if the remarriage is 
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party 
paying alimony is made a party to the aclion of annulment and his rights are detei mined " 
(West 2004) The fact that alimony can be reinstated even after a marriage with 
accompanying cohabitation shows that the legislature is concerned with the solidarity of 
the relationship 
Respondent argues that the court should have discretion over whether to terminate 
alimony retroactively Respondent's Bi at 11 As support for this proposition, 
Respondent cites Wall v Wall "The legislature's use of 'may' clearly gives the court 
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discretion to make child support modification retroactive." Respondent's Br. at 11; Wall 
v. Wall, 2007 UT App 61, 1j 20, 157 P.3d 341. However, in Wall, the court was quoting 
language from Utah Code section 78B-12-112(4) (previously numbered as 78-45-9.3(4)). 
Respondent devotes about four pages to explaining why section 78B-12-112(4) is 
inapposite to this issue and why section 30-5-3(10) should apply. Respondent's Br. at 8-
12. If section 78B-12-112(4) does not apply to this issue, as Respondent urges, the court 
should not have the discretion authorized by that section to modify alimony retroactively. 
Respondent cites Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908 (Utah App. 1995), as precedent for 
the proposition that alimony may be terminated retroactively based on cohabitation. 
While it is true that the Court of Appeals in Sigg upheld the trial court's decision, which 
included a retroactive termination of alimony, Id. at 917-18, the issue of whether a court 
could retroactively terminate alimony was not directly addressed. The trial court in Sigg 
modified alimony retroactively to the date of cohabitation, which was eight (8) months 
before the petition to modify was filed. The statutes and case law argued herein were not 
addressed or raised in Sigg nor is the holding in Sigg applicable herein because it didn't 
address these issues. In this case more than five (5) years have elapsed and to 
retroactively terminate alimony to the date of cohabitation would result in significant 
hardship and injustice. The continuances and delays in this matter are not attributable to 
the Appellant and it is not appropriate that she should be the party to suffer what is 
proposed by the Respondent. 
II. IF THIS COURT DETERMINES THAT A COURT HAS 
DISCRETION TO TERMINATE ALIMONY RETROACTIVELY BASED 
ON COHABITATION UNDER UTAH CODE SECTION 30-5-3(10), THE 
3 
TRIAL COURT SHOULD ALSO HAVE DISCRETION OVER THE 
LENGTH OF TIME OF RETROACTIVITY, BUT NOT BEYOND THE 
TIME WHEN NOTICE OF THE ACTION TO TERMINATE ALIMONY 
BASED ON COHABITATION WAS RECEIVED. 
Respondent aigues that if the tnal court judge letroactively terminates alimony, 
he has no discretion o\er the time penod of retroactivity, but must terminate alimony to 
the date cohabitation began Respondenf s Br at 15 If this Court determines that Utah 
Code section 30-5-3(10) gives the tnal court discretion over whethei to teimmate 
alimony retroactively, it would be more consistent with the statutory framewoik to allow 
the judge to determine both whether the award should be retroactive and the period of 
retroactivity, as in section 78B-12-112(4) (pieviously numbered as 78-45-9 3(4)) 
However, the trial court should not have discretion to terminate alimony 
retroactively to a date prior to when notice was given of the action to terminate alimony 
based on cohabitation Section 78B-12-] 12(4) (previously numbered as 78-45-9 3(4) 
allows for the retroactive modification of spousal support orders That section also has a 
limitation "A child or spousal support payment under a support order may be modified 
with respect to any period during which a modification is pending, but only from the date 
of service of the pleading on the obligee, " Id Because section 30-5-3(10) is silent 
legarding the court's power to retroactively terminate alimony based on cohabitation, if 
this Court decides that retroactive termination is permissible, it should also adopt the 
limitation of section 78B-12-112(4) (pieviously numbeied as 78-45-9 3(4) which tempers 
the harsh results that can result when alimony is terminated retroactively In this case, 
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notice of the action to terminate alimony based on cohabitation was received m June of 
2005, so the teimination of alimony should not extend to a date previous to that date 
The Respondent, when he requested to amend his petition for modification in June 
2005, placed in the amended petition a request for the ruling to be nunc pro tunc The 
Respondent knew that the request was contrary to statute and the existing case law which 
is why the lequest was made Appellant opposed the amendment and lequested that the 
tnal court lequire that a new petition for modification be filed and served and furnished 
to the trial court the statutory and case law basis of why that should be done supporting 
her position (See Exhibits C and D which are attached to Appellant's Brief See also R 
346-349 and 356-357 ) The arguments as made by Appellant in opposing the amended 
petition for modification are applicable here and support the position as contained in the 
then statute of UCA §78-45-9 3(4) prohibiting modification of the alimony anytime 
earlier than when the Respondent amended his petition for modification in June 2005 
III. THE LONGSTANDING RULE UNDER UTAH STATUTES AND 
COMMON LAW PROVIDES THAT TRIAL COURTS MAY MAKE 
RETROACTIVE ALIMONY MODIFICATIONS ONLY TO THE DATE A 
MODIFICATION PETITION IS SERVED. 
In Wilde v Wilde, 2001 UT App 318, the court squarely addressed the issue of 
retroactive modification of alimony 
Under the statutes discussed above and Utah common law, we conclude trial 
courts have the discretion to award modified alimony retroactively to the date a 
modification petition is served The Utah Supreme Court has suggested that courts 
have the discretion to retroactively award modified alimony for the period during 
which a modification is pending See Marks v Marks, 98 Utah 400, 404, 100 P 2d 
207, 209 (Utah 1940) (noting "comt[s] do[] not have the power to modify an 
installment of alimony which has accrued pnor to the making of the application to 
modify the decree" (emphasis added)) (citing Myers v Myers, 62 Utah 90, 218 P 
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123 (Utah 1923)). This is clearly the majority rule. See Hill v. Hill, 435 S.E.2d 
766, 768 (N.C. 1993) (m[A] majority of the courts of other states which have 
considered the question have held a trial court may make modifications effective 
as of the date the petition is filed.'" (quoting Kruse v. Kruse, 464 N.E.2d 934, 938 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1984))); Trezvant v. Trezvant, 403 A.2d 1134, 1138 (D.C. 1979) 
("[T]he few cases addressing this question in other jurisdictions have also 
concluded that orders increasing support payments may, in the discretion of the 
trial judge, be retroactive to the date when application for the increase was made." 
(citing McArthur v. McArthur, 106 So. 2d 73, 76 (Fla. 1958) (citations omitted))); 
cf.Shelton v. Shelton, 885 P.2d 807, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (concluding 
retroactive award of alimony was within trial court's discretion because obligor 
deceived court regarding income and other equities were not present). 
Wilde v. Wilde, 2001 UT App 318, ^ 23. 
In Wilde, the court was analyzing Utah Code section 30-3-10.6(2), which is now 
renumbered and amended at 78B-12-112(4) (2008). That section provides in relevant 
part, "(4) A child or spousal support payment under a support order may be modified 
with respect to any period during which a modification is pending, but only from the date 
of service of the pleading on the obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner, or on the obligor, 
if the obligee is the petitioner." Although Respondent contends that section 78B-12-
112(4) should not apply to a petition to terminate alimony based on cohabitation, 
(Respondent's Br. at 8-12), we note that the Wilde court did not rely solely on the above 
statute, but based its decision on both "the statutes . . . and Utah common law." Wilde v. 
Wilde, 2001 UT App 318, f^ 23 (emphasis added). Utah law thus clearly provides in both 
statutes and case law that alimony may be modified retroactively only to the date of 
service of the modification petition, which in this case is June 2005. 
Recognizing the law that prevents retroactive modification of alimony previous to 
the service of the modification petition, the trial court below made a retroactive 
modification of alimony to the date of the modification petition, which was on June 7, 
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2001 (R 76-80) However, we argue that this decision was error or abuse of discretion 
foi two (2) reasons First, Respondent failed to prosecute the 2001 claim, See Petr's Br 
at 4, and should be estopped or piecluded fiom using the 2001 date because of the 
doctiine of laches Second, the cohabitation claim was entirely different from the claim 
on which the 2001 modification petition was based, and did not provide petitionei notice 
of the cohabitation claim See Petr's Br at 11-12 Instead of using the June 2001 date, 
the trial court should have used the date of June 2005, when the cohabitation claim was 
made, (R 748 ), as the earliest date to which alimony could be retroactively modified 
CONCLUSION 
Under the plain language of Utah Code section 30-3-5(10), alimony may not be 
terminated retioactively If this Court holds that alimony may be terminated 
retroactively, such termination should not relate back further than when notice of the 
action to terminate alimony based on cohabitation is received 
Wherefore, Kim S Black prays that this Court reverse the judgment and order of 
the trial court and hold that retroactive termination of alimony is inconsistent with section 
30-3-5(10) Additionally, this Court should deny Respondent's request for attorney's 
fees and costs, (see Br of Respondent at 15), as Respondent does not set forth a "legal 
basis for such an award" as required by Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Proceduie The tual couit did not award attorney fees, nor should this court 
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